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Withholding and withdrawing a treatment already established are two forms of limitation of the therapeutic effort
(LTE). The question of undergoing or not undergoing lifesaving medical treatments is not restricted to a specific
health care context, as it refers to a variety of treatments, and it does not concern a restricted group of diseases.
LTE has become part of the options compatible with the good clinical practice, in accordance with a deep change
in modern medicine’s ‘mission’ along with the increased importance attributed to the patient’s general, personal
condition, and to the quality of his/her life. However, LTE remains a controversial issue, and it still has many
opponents, in particular, but not exclusively, in those cases in which the question is the withdrawal of treatments,
which a widespread conventional wisdom considers ethically and legally different from not initiating treatments.
But is it justified to address LTE as a totally controversial issue, especially in case of withdrawal of treatments? The
paper answers negatively by arguing that there are criteria both in medical ethics and in law often adequate
enough to remove doubts, and to guide decisions and actions.
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Withholding and withdrawing a treatment already estab-
lished are two forms of limitation of the therapeutic effort
(LTE) which consist in not applying pharmacological ther-
apies or instrumental procedures, more or less invasive,
considered (by the scientific community) adequate to treat
diseases which put life at risk. LTE, framed within the
question ‘to what extent and under which conditions it is
justifiable to decide not to initiate a treatment or to with-
draw it in case it has already been established’, presupposes
a wide availability of lifesaving therapeutic tools. Therefore,
LTE is strictly connected with the extraordinary advances
in modern technology and medicine, occurred in the
second half of the XX century. Since then, modern
medicine has constantly increased its power to control
death by modulating its duration and modes, as it disposes
of procedures to prolong survival termed ‘lifesaving
medical treatments’. This term refers to a wide range of
interventions and treatments including not only resuscita-
tion practices and mechanical cardiopulmonary ventilation,Correspondence: patrizia.borsellino@unimib.it
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unless otherwise stated.but also those procedures useful to support or replace basic
compromised vital functions, as in the case of dialysis in
case of kidney dysfunction, or of devices like defibrillators
helpful to contrast lethal cardiac dysfunctions. But the
prevalent opinion accepted by the majority of the scientific
community also includes artificial nutrition and hydration,
along with many categories of pharmacological treatments
like antibiotics. Consequently, the question of undergoing
or not undergoing lifesaving medical treatments is not
limited to a specific health care context, as it refers to a
variety of treatments, and it does not concern a restricted
group of diseases. On the contrary, LTE is a comprehensive
problem. Not only physicians dealing with resuscitation
and intensive therapies face it, but also those who
take care of terminal patients - often suffering from a
polypathological condition - with chronic degenerative
diseases (oncological, neurological, cardiovascular, kidney
diseases), as well as those physicians who work with a
growing aging population with serious forms of cognitive
impairment due to Alzheimer’s disease or other forms of
senile dementia. Therefore, the first but not uniqueis is an Open Access article distributed under the terms of the Creative
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tools useful to prolong survival. This represents a distin-
guishing feature of modern medicine if compared to the
pre-modern one, which faced the opposite problem, i.e.
the scarcity of therapeutic tools. The further, not less
relevant condition is the ‘problematization’ of the
assumption that each therapy, in particular if lifesaving,
has to be considered useful, and as such deserving to be
applied in any case to the patient as it is available. In other
words, the question if everything we can do to keep an
individual alive ought also to be done, presupposes
that the ‘therapeutic privilege’ is brought into question.
According to this ‘privilege’, the physician has traditionally
had the exclusive power to decide if to administer a treat-
ment, and if to intervene to restore health, or at least and
in any case, to choose all those interventions needed to
safeguard patients’ survival.
Today, LTE has become part of the options compatible
with the good clinical practice, in accordance with a
deep change of the modern medicine’s ‘mission’
along with the increased importance attributed to the
patient’s general, personal condition, and to the quality of
his/her life.
However, LTE remains a controversial issue, and it still
has many opponents, in particular, but not exclusively,
in those cases in which the question is the withdrawal of
treatments, which widespread conventional wisdom
considers ethically and legally different from not initiating
them. But is it justified to address LTE as a totally contro-
versial issue, especially in case of withdrawal of treatments?
The paper answers negatively by arguing that there
are criteria both in medical ethics and in law often
adequate enough to remove doubts, and to guide decisions
and actions.
Discussion
LTE and refusal of treatments in case of competent
patients
The framework, within which the issue of LTE has to be
addressed, is the one defined by those principles and
rules, which govern both the international and national
legal order, along with the context of medical ethics.
Those principles and rules have affirmed the key role
played by the self-determination principle in making
treatment decisions. If it can be stated that patients’
self-determination in Anglo-Saxon countries finds a
culturally more fertile ground than in countries with
dissimilar traditions, for instance the New-Latin ones
like Italy, it cannot be denied that, even in Italy, medical
practice is subjected to rules established at different
levels of the legal order a and to provisions stated
both in the Code of Medical Ethics (2006), and in the
Code of Ethics for Nurses (2009). All these rules link
the power/duty of care to the respect of the patient’swill, which the patient expresses by accepting through
informed consent or by dissenting, and therefore refusing
a given treatment.
The current legal-ethical framework subordinates all
medical interventions and treatments to the patient’s
will, without providing exceptions either in relation to
patients in critical conditions or to lifesaving treatments.
This system affects the whole system of physicians’
powers, duties, and liabilities, and generally of health
care workers. Moreover, it also influences the question of
LTE directly. Indeed, from the mentioned legal-ethical
framework follows that not all measures with therapeutic
purposes and applied in respect of the rules of the art, but
even not all measures, which, if not initiated, put the
patient’s life at risk, ought to be considered legitimate,
or even owed. Given this legal-ethical framework, we
can regard those measures to which the patient (also
in emergency cases) has consciously consented after
being adequately informed about the nature of the
intervention and the risks deriving from not undergoing it
as legitimate.
It follows that if a competent patient refuses a life
sustaining treatment, which is considered too burdensome
or incompatible with his/her beliefs, the physician has the
duty to desist from administering itb, by not including it in
the available options. However, withdrawal of treatments
does not equate with withdrawal of care, achieved by
establishing palliative measures to relieve suffering
and pain. The patient’s firm and unmistakable refusal
of a lifesaving treatment impacts on the physician’s
commitment to preserving survival at any cost. Differ-
ently from the past, when the physician’s commitment
to preserving survival at any cost was considered ‘a
mandatory content’ of the physician’s responsibility
toward his/her patient [1]. Instead today, there is no
doubt that the patient’s valid consent or refusal is
fundamental in terms of lawfulness and imperative-
ness to the decision of initiating or not initiating a
treatment. This is true even in those cases in which this
could prevent death or imply stopping a treatment already
established, and in some cases administered to the patient
for a long time.
This occurred in the case of Piergiorgio Welbyc [1-3],
who made headlines in Italy some years ago. This case
represented a paradigmatic example of a wider case history
in the clinical practice. When the patient dissents from
maintaining the administered life sustaining treatment - in
Welby’s case assisted ventilation - though originally
accepted, the treatment is no longer legitimate.
Indeed, its refusal undermines its ethical and legal
foundation, in just the same way as the lack of a
valid consent results in an illegitimate and morally
unacceptable administration of a treatment refused
by the patient.
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the advance directives’ way
The will of the patient able to make decisions offers a
clear and well-defined criterion to guide decisions
with regard to LTE in both above-mentioned forms.
Nevertheless, this criterion is still undervalued and
not sufficiently implemented, on the one hand, by
reason of the persistence among health workers of
attitudes and approaches not faithful to the mandatory
duty of information and of patient’s participation in the
decision-making process. On the other hand, psychological
resistance to confrontation with death still plays a role in
maintaining the rooted conviction that death represents
the physician’s burning failure, to be avoided by any means.
But what is to be done in those numerous situations
in which patients lack decision-making capacity?
The first aspect to be underlined is that, with regard to
this specific health care context, which has been tradition-
ally considered subject to the physician’s exclusive
decisional power - and to some extent it still is - the new,
guiding, clinical decision-making model recognizes the
central role played by the patient’s will, beliefs, and values,
and by his/her participation – though indirectly to health
care decisions.
This purpose can be achieved by taking into account the
patient’s will expressed before becoming incompetent with
regard to the treatments he/she accepts to undergo or not
in relation to future pathological conditions (living will),
and contextually, or as an alternative, with reference to
the appointment of an agent (substitute person) to make
his/her health care decisions and to participate to the
decision-making process (health care power of attorney).
This is the way of the advance directives, for which there
is no legal regulation in Italy, different from other
European and extra-European countries [4], despite the
numerous bills [1] elaborated by the Italian Parliament
starting in 2004. However, in spite of this situation, there
is no legal vacuum. Indeed, there are legal and ethical
rules which oblige the physician to take into account
previously expressed wishesd, but even prior to these,
there are provisions of the Italian Constitution which
prohibit unjustified unequal treatments due to personal
conditions (Art. 3), and protect the fundamental freedom
of thought (Art. 21) and of religion (Art. 19).
In principle, the widespread practice to subscribe
advance directives may supply physicians with a formal
expression of the patients’ will-in some cases, in favor of
withholding or withdrawing life sustaining treatments -
also in those situations in which the loss of competence
is due to accidental causes or to a sudden event.
However, in the majority of the cases, the loss of compe-
tence follows the development of a degenerative disease, or
it is induced as it occurs for surgical interventions
performed under general anesthesia. And these are casesfor which it is realistic and hopeful to include the practice
of subscribing advance directives in the LTE’s criteria. In
the circumstances envisaged, in which decisions concern
future events not radically undefined, collecting the
patient’s expressed wishes within an advance care planning
program represents the ethically correct strategy to
promote the perfect extension of the impacts of self-
determination to patients lacking decision-making
capacity [5]. In this way, it would be possible to avoid
the risk of inappropriate treatments with regard to
objectives in terms of health and quality of life, which
no one can presume to evaluate better than the patient
himself/herself.
LTE between medical evaluation and substitute decisions
The appreciation of the patient’s advance as well as
current will is required by the model of therapeutic
relationship inspired by the idea that the duplicity of
those subjects involved in the clinical decision-making
process should not be lost. And this is true even in
those cases in which decisions concern incompetent
patients, and even more so when critical decisions are
made, for instance withholding or withdrawing lifesaving
treatments. In the Italian legal framework, though in
absence of a legal act regulating the powers of the trustee
designated by the beneficiary of the health care in a ‘living
will’, the above-mentioned model has been promptly
implemented by those legal rules providing figures
like guardianse and ‘supporting administrators’f, who
are responsible for the care of the person and have
the task to interact with the health care workers, because it
is stated that, when a person “…does not have the capacity
to consent to an intervention,…[this] intervention may
only be carried out with the authorization of his or
her representative or an authority or a person or body
provided for by law”g.
On the one hand, following the opposite trend to the
traditional paternalistic approach, this model no longer
permits regarding the physician as the unique legitimate
decision-maker. On the other hand, however, the same
model demands both giving proper consideration to
the role played by the medical evaluation and not
misinterpreting the nature and limits of the decision
power given to the person appointed.
As for the medical evaluation, the main aspect to be
underlined is that, in any pathological condition, irrespective
of the patient’s capacity or incapacity to make valid
decisions, it plays a fundamental role in identifying
those treatments to be considered adequate, and therefore
worthy of proposing. Indeed, the medical evaluation, which
alone can define the foreseeable scenarios in relation to
administering selected treatments or not, is the premise of
any expression of the patient’s conscious will, including the
refusal of a lifesaving treatment already established or to be
Borsellino Multidisciplinary Respiratory Medicine  (2015) 10:5 Page 4 of 5initiated. In any case, there is no doubt that the medical
evaluation, grounded on evidence of clinical effectiveness,
earns prime relevance when it is impossible to refer to the
patient’s current or advance expressed will. This occurs in
the majority of emergency interventions on incompetent
patients due to accidental causes (paradigmatic examples
are interventions in the ER on victims of car accidents),
and in the circumstances envisaged, there is no place for
legal representatives, whose substitute authorization is
generally provided for interventions on incompetent
patients by legal and ethical rules. In these situations, as it
occurs in other numerous cases, in which the unavailability
of the patient’s will does not depend on the circumstances,
rather on the enduring resistance to inform him/her and to
make an advance care planning, it is up to the physician to
evaluate if and on what conditions a treatment functional
to prolonging survival is also adequate, and therefore, if
and to what extent it has to be administered or not.
However, what are useful standards for defining the
inadequacy on which it is possible to justify withholding or
withdrawing treatments according to clinical evaluation?
In the United States, where the patients’ self-determination
has been emphasized earlier and more than in other
countries, the question has been addressed - in the
late 80s and early 90s - as part of the debate on the
‘medical futility’. In this frame, it was initially argued
that useless treatments, i.e. “that cannot reasonably be
expected to achieve even its physiological objective”h,
ought not to be administered. This initial restrictive
interpretation, which seems to limit the evaluation
concerning the inadequacy of a treatment to the meagerness
of the advantage in terms of quantity of life, and therefore
to the predictability of its failure, has been overcome by a
more comprehensive trend, which has been confirmed by
provisions in relevant international documents along with
important stances made on the part of Italian scientific
associationsi. On the one hand, supporters of this new trend
are in favor of the inclusion, within the criteria which justify
LTE, of treatments’ inadequacy with regard to the objective
of achieving a significant benefit and of improving the
patient’s quality of life. And on the other hand, they con-
sider the treatments’ onerousness as part of LTE’s criteria.
This onerousness is viewed from a psychological perspective
when referred to the patient’s family members, and from a
stricter economic viewpoint when it concerns society as a
whole. The inclusion of a society-related viewpoint in the
LTE’s criteria is justified by the consideration that the
administration of treatments to patients who cannot benefit
from them because of the seriousness of their condition
deprives society of precious resources, which could be
employed to treat patients with a different clinical situation.
Therefore, LTE, which can be considered justifiable,
above all on the ground of the medical evaluation, is the
one which aims at achieving the best interest of thepatient, without ignoring other interests at stake. The
definition of the ‘best interest’ takes into account the
peculiarity of the patient’s clinical situation along with
his/her expectations. These are exactly the main factors
to be considered by the substitute decision-maker.
Indeed, when a person, other than the recipient of the
treatments, is involved in the decision-making process,
he/she does not have the unconditional power to dispose
of the incapable patient’s health and life. His/her powers
are restricted by the ‘best interest’ of the beneficiary.
This ‘best interest’ could be achieved if one decides
neither ‘in place of ’ nor ‘for’ the incapable person, but
‘with’ him/her, as the Italian Court of Cassation effectively
stated in its decision on the Englaro casej. In other words,
the decision is made in accordance with the patient’s will,
and when this is presumed, by inferring it from his/her
personality, life style, inclinations, and moral values.
Conclusions
Life sustaining treatments –ranging from resuscitation
techniques, assisted ventilation, to artificial nutrition and
hydration - represent valued and irreplaceable devices in
the context of modern medicine. However, we should
not lose sight of their aim, which consists in recovering
vital compromised functions, or at least in controlling
suffering and in maintaining a level of quality and
dignity of life which the patient considers acceptable,
and not in prolonging the death process of individuals
who cannot benefit from lifesaving treatments because of
their critical health state. With regard to these patients,
health care workers are not always morally, deontologically,
and legally obliged to initiate or to continue lifesaving
treatments. Instead, LTE may rather represent the needed
premise to give the kind of assistance, in the palliative
care’s perspective, whose main purpose is to preserve ill
persons from unnecessary suffering, granting them their
dignity until the end of life.
As far as the withdrawal of a life sustaining treatment
already established is concerned, the persistence of the
‘prejudice’ about its generalized illegality will hinder the
activity of a good clinical practice. Instead, it would be
of great advantage for a good practice the spreading and
rooting of the idea that, in uncertain situations, it could
be worth initiating a treatment, which could benefit
the patient, rather than abandoning the option of
administering it in fear of the impossibility of withholding
it once initiated.
Endnotes
aArticles 13 and 32 of the Italian Constitution; Article
5 of the Convention on Biomedicine and Human Rights
(Oviedo 1997); Article 3 of the Charter of Fundamental
Rights of the European Union (Nizza 2000). Both the
Convention on Biomedicine and Human Rights and the
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are part of the highest level of the Italian legal order
since the Lisbon Treaty entered into force in 2009.
bThe Code of Medical Ethics (2006), Article 35 “the
physician cannot perform any diagnostic or therapeutic
treatment without the patient’s explicit and informed
consent… In any case, in the presence of a recorded
refusal of a capable person, the physician must desist
from the consequent diagnostic and therapeutic acts as
it is prohibited any medical treatment administered
against the patient’s will”.
cWelby was diagnosed with muscular dystrophy as a
teenager in the early 1960s. The disease progressed, and
in 1997 he became unable to breathe on his own.
However, he was capable of expressing consent or
refusal to medical treatments and did not need a third
person as his legal representative. Therefore, he asked
his physician to discontinue mechanical ventilation and
meanwhile to administer him palliative sedation. For a
long time his request to discontinue medical treatments
has remained unheard. The main reason for not complying
with his request was the risk for the physician of being
indicated for murder (Article 575 of the Italian Criminal
Code. In Italy, as there is no Act concerning euthanasia
and/or assisted suicide, the courts apply the provisions of
the criminal code concerning murder). The physician who
eventually stopped the mechanical ventilation was later
tried and acquitted of a ‘killing on demand’ charge
(‘Killing on demand’, that is ‘omicidio del consenziente’,
takes place when the person expresses a consent to be
killed. Decision n. 2047/2007 of the Court of Rome).
Indeed, in this case, as Welby's request was voluntary and
not dictated by external pressures, there were no ethical
and legal arguments for impeding the application of the
principle of ‘willingness’ to treatments (Article 32 Italian
Constitution).
dConvention on Biomedicine and Human Rights
(Oviedo 1997), Article 9; the Code of Medical Ethics
(2006), Articles 16, 35, 36, 38.
eSee Article 357 of the Italian Civil Code concern-
ing personal care decisions on the part of the legal
representative.
fThe’supporting administrator’ has been introduced in
Italy with Act 6, 9 January 2004, which reformed Articles
404–414 of the Italian Civil Code.
gConvention on Biomedicine and Human Rights,
Article 6.3.
hThe Appleton Consensus, 1992, in Bioetica. Rivista
interdisciplinare, 1992, 3, pp. 397–431.
iSee two documents of the Italian Bioethics Commission
of the Italian Society of Anesthesia, Analgesia, and
Intensive Care (SIAARTI),), Raccomandazioni SIAARTI
per l‘ammissione e la dimissione dalla terapia intensiva e
per la limitazione dei trattamenti in terapia intensiva, inMinerva anestesiologica, 69, 2003, pp. 101–118 e Le cure
di fine vita e l’anestesista rianimatore: Raccomandazioni
SIAARTI per l’approccio al malato morente, in Minerva
anestesiologica, 72, 2006, pp.1-23.
jCourt of Cassation, Civil Section. Decision n. 21748,
2007, October 18.
Abbreviation
LTE: limitation of the therapeutic effort.
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